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PAGE 01

TOR:020723Z APR 75

S E C R E T 020540Z APR 75 STAFF

CITE

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

REF: DIRECTOR 675920

LAYTON FROM

1. FOLLOWING PERSONAL VIEWS ARE SUBMITTED IN EFFORT TO  
BE HELPFUL ON COMMUNITY'S NEXT MILITARY ASSESSMENT DESCRIBED  
REF. USE AS YOU SEE FIT,

2. KEY POINT TO BE MADE IN MY JUDGMENT IS THAT NORTH  
VIETNAM NOW HAS CAPABILITY TO WIN TOTAL MILITARY VICTORY IN THE  
SOUTH WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS. ONE CAN DEBATE NOW MUCH OF  
THE REMAINING NVA STRATEGIC RESERVE OR HOW MANY NVA COMBAT UNITS  
NOW IN MR-1 OR MR-2 WOULD BE NEEDED FURTHER SOUTH TO ACHIEVE  
TOTAL VICTORY, BUT THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT SUCH A VICTORY BY  
HANOI IS ACHIEVABLE. THE MAGNITUDE OF RVNAF'S DEFEAT IN MR-1  
AND MR-2 HAS DECISIVELY CHANGED THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN SOUTH  
VIETNAM.

3. PRESENT INFORMATION DOES NOT ALLOW A FIRM JUDGMENT AS  
TO WHETHER HANOI WILL NOW CHANGE FROM ITS MORE DELIBERATE

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PAGE 02

TOR: 020723Z APR 75

"COSVN 1975" STRATEGY AND GO ALL-OUT FOR IMMEDIATE VICTORY.  
SINCE WE ARE IN BUSINESS OF MAKING ESTIMATES, HOWEVER, I WOULD  
PUSH FOR A COMMUNITY ESTIMATE THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL SEEK TOTAL  
MILITARY VICTORY IN NEXT THREE MONTHS. RECENT MOVEMENTS OF NVA  
STRATEGIC RESERVE UNITS POINT IN THIS DIRECTION.

4. THERE IS NO PROPER PLACE FOR IT IN AN INTELLIGENCE  
ASSESSMENT, BUT IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT MILITARY AID TO  
THE GVN AT ANY LEVEL LIKELY TO BE APPROVED BY THE U.S. CONGRESS  
WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT CHANGE THE PROGNOSIS.

5. IN SUM, THE ODDS ARE STRONG (A) THAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL  
MAKE AN ALL-OUT MILITARY EFFORT IN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS, AND  
(B) THAT THEY WILL WIN.

6. REALIZE THAT PARAGRAPHS ABOVE CONTAIN VIEWS FAR MORE  
PESSIMISTIC THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THE AUTHOR. STRONGLY  
BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT VIEWS AS BLEAK SHOULD APPEAR IN THE  
ASSESSMENT, AND THAT WHAT GOES DOWNTOWN SHOULD CONTAIN ABSOLUTELY  
CATEGORICAL JUDGMENTS ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION.  
E2 IMPDET.

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